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Abstract 
Social scientists increasingly expect to have access to detailed data for research purposes. As the level of detail 
increases, data providers worry about “spontaneous recognition”, the likelihood that a microdata user believes that 
he or she has accidentally identified one of the data subjects in the dataset, and may share that information. This 
concern, particularly in respect of microdata on businesses, leads to excessive restrictions on data use. 
We argue that spontaneous recognition presents no meaningful risk to confidentiality. The standard models of 
deliberate attack on the data cover re-identification risk to an acceptable standard under most current legislation. If 
spontaneous recognition did occur, the user is very unlikely to be in breach of any law or condition of access. Any 
breach would only occur as a result of further actions by the user to confirm or assert identity, and these should be 
seen as a managerial problem. 
Nevertheless, a consideration of spontaneous recognition does highlight some of the implicit assumptions made in 
data access decisions. It also shows the importance of the data provider’s culture and attitude. For data providers 
focused on users, spontaneous recognition is a useful check on whether all relevant risks have been addressed; 
for those focused on the risks. For data providers primarily concerned with the risks of release, it provides a way to 
place insurmountable barriers in front of those wanting to increase data access. 
We present a case study on a business dataset to show how rejecting the concept of spontaneous recognition led 
to a substantial change in research outcomes. 
Executive summary 
There is a reasonable expectation nowadays that social science researchers can have access to the source data 
underlying published statistics. Data providers can be nervous about this when the source data is confidential, 
even if the data has had direct identifiers such as names removed. 
One issue raised is “spontaneous recognition”: the idea that a researcher using the data might recognise a 
neighbour, or a famous person, for example.  This is a particular problem for data about companies: large public 
companies are assumed to be easy to recognise with just a couple of pieces of information, such as size and type 
of business. The amount of information available on the internet only appears to make this problem worse. The 
only way to prevent spontaneous recognition is to reduce the detail in the data, which may defeat the purpose of 
making that data available. In some cases data providers have refused to release data at all, arguing that 
spontaneous recognition cannot be eliminated. 
 This paper agrees that, indeed, spontaneous recognition cannot be eliminated; but it also argues that it is 
impossible to prove that it cannot exist in any dataset. This makes it useless as an aid to decision-making. 
Moreover, there is no legal basis to the use of this concept for stopping data access. Existing methods of 
confidentiality protection, using both statistical and non-statistical controls, provide more than adequate protection, 
and the evidence suggests that these are effective in practice as well as in theory. 
Why then do data providers refer to spontaneous recognition as a potential problem? The answer is a complex 
manifestation of cultural factors, institutional incentives, and a defensive confidentiality literature. These encourage 
decision-makers to be overly risk-averse, and to seek to avoid or transfer responsibility. 
This traditional “default-closed” attitude can be contrasted with the “default-open” attitude emerging amongst data 
providers and the confidentiality community. The default-open model uses evidence-based risk assessment (rather 
than hypothetical worst cases), and requires proof that a problem does exist (rather than proof that a problem does 
not exist). 
This paper uses an example of creating a file of business data for scientific research use, adopting the arguments 
described in this paper. Compared to the previous “traditional” strategy, the revised approach led to a fall from 
100% to less than 1% of records being perturbed: a dataset which was previously seen mostly as a teaching 
resource is now much closer to its original research value. 
  
 1. Introduction 
Social scientists increasingly expect to have access to detailed source microdata for research purposes. The 
twenty-first century has seen major advances in the availability of detailed social science microdata for research 
purposes. Two elements combined to make much more of the data collected by national statistics institutes (NSIs) 
and other government departments available to researchers: 
 secure, remote access to detailed data with few limitations on researcher use; 
 external pressure on NSIs to make data available. 
These have driven a massive expansion in the research use of microdata provided by government. The 
proliferation of digital information has also increased the range of data sources across different platforms, but NSI 
and other government data remains the most important for much research, particularly in economics and in public 
health. 
However, this growth in data access has not always been actively driven by the data providers. As Ritchie (2016) 
notes, data providers, particularly in government, are often reluctant to release data. This arises from institutional 
and incentive structures which encourage a risk-averse attitude to decision-making (Ritchie, 2014b). Decision-
makers are supported in this attitude by the academic literature; this overwhelmingly focuses on hypotheticals and 
the risk to the data provider, rather than the public benefits foregone by overly restrictive access (Hafner et al., 
2015a). 
The issue of “spontaneous recognition” illustrates the difficulties facing those trying to improve access.  
Spontaneous recognition occurs when a microdata user believes that he or she has identified, without trying, one 
of the data subjects in the dataset: a neighbour, a co-worker, an organisation, or a group of patients, for example. 
The identification need not even be correct: the perceived breach of confidentiality can be as important as an 
actual breach. This worries data providers wanting to allow researchers to use confidential data: no matter how 
trustworthy researchers seem to be, they are still human and the recognition of an individual might lead to the 
disclosure of information about an identified data subject. Hence, data providers are often insistent on minimising 
the risk of spontaneous recognition. 
Despite this, very little attention is paid to this topic in the literature. Almost every manual on statistical disclosure 
control (SDC) or data provider’s guide to data handling mentions the topic, but only as a pedagogical device 
before moving on to more sophisticated models. 
Nevertheless, it is an important topic. Spontaneous recognition creates an additional, sometimes insurmountable, 
hurdle to be addressed by those requesting access to data. It is not possible, in general, to show that there is no 
risk of spontaneous recognition; this gives great power to those resistant to releasing data for re-use by scientific 
researchers or the public. This is particularly true in the case of business data, where the “obvious” identifiability of 
businesses by one or two characteristics such as size and industry has been used in the past to restrict research 
access to the data. 
We argue that the hurdle is an irrelevant distraction: spontaneous recognition has little or no practical contribution 
to make in the question of whether or not a dataset should be released. It is highly unlikely that there is any lawful 
or ethical basis for the concept. Other SDC methods cover the reasonable requirements of law and access 
conditions. If any re-identification did occur spontaneously, it is an unconscious human act. It is the actions of the 
data user which should be governed, not the recognition itself. These actions are better governed by management 
procedures. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the fleeting appearance of spontaneous 
recognition in the literature. Section three gives the definition that will be used in this paper, which differs slightly 
from the general definition in that it allows for mistakes. Section four then considers whether spontaneous 
recognition is a useful statistical concept, a legal problem or a managerial issue, and concludes that it is only the 
latter. Section five considers the institutional impact of the concept, and shows how it can be helpful or obstructive 
depending on the organisation’s attitude. Finally, section six introduces a short case study, where a rejection of 
spontaneous recognition led to a substantially improved dataset. Section seven concludes. 
For clarity of exposition, we assume that data access is being managed by the NSI. However, the issues raised 
here, particularly in relation to public sector culture and attitudes, are relevant for all data providers. 
2. Spontaneous recognition in the confidentiality literature 
The probability of spontaneous recognition is a statistical characteristic of the data. The OECD Glossary of 
Statistical Terms defines “spontaneous recognition” as 
“…the recognition of an individual within the dataset. This may occur by accident or because a data intruder is 
searching for a particular individual. This is more likely to be successful if the individual has a rare combination of 
characteristics which is known to the intruder.” (OECD, 2005) 
This glossary was defined and adopted to encourage the consistent use of statistical language across countries, 
academics and NSIs. However, the definition given above is not widely used, largely because it includes deliberate 
searching. 
Duncan et al. (2011) give the more commonly understood definition:  
“The notion of spontaneous recognition is simple. You know of person X who has an unusual combination of 
attribute values. You are working on a data set and observe that a record within that data set also has those same 
attribute values. You infer that the record must be that of person X. In order to be truly spontaneous you must have 
no intent to identify. Otherwise this is just a specific form of deliberate linkage.” (Duncan et al., p. 35) 
Duncan et al. (2011, p. 29) explicitly distinguish spontaneous recognition from “snooping” or “intruder” models 
where the user takes actions specifically to identify a data subject. Spontaneous recognition is the “specific form” 
of the more general intruder model because it does not require active searching.  
In one sense, there is a large literature discussing spontaneous recognition: most of the general statistical works 
on SDC (e.g. Hundepool et al., 2012) cover it, as do the guidelines produced by NSIs. It is often used to give 
examples of extreme values; for example, GSS (2014) propose: 
“An intruder may spontaneously recognise an individual in the microdata by means of published information. This 
can occur for instance when a respondent has unusual characteristics and is either an acquaintance or a well-
known public figure such as a politician, an entertainer or a very successful business person. An example is the 
“Rich List” which publishes annual salaries of high-earning individuals.” (GSS, 2014, p. 18) 
Spontaneous recognition is then typically used to explain why extreme values or population uniques are 
problematic and may need to be removed from the data. 
However, this is pretty much the full extent of the discussion in the SDC literature. As Hafner et al. (2015a) have 
noted, almost all of the confidentiality literature is focused on deliberate attempts to re-identify the data, the 
“intruder” model. In this context, spontaneous recognition disappears as an uninteresting special case: the intruder 
 goes straight to identification without the need for statistical analysis (although the intruder may carry out some 
statistical analysis to confirm the identification). 
In summary, in the confidentiality literature, spontaneous recognition is a useful teaching tool but is otherwise not 
considered. 
3. Defining spontaneous recognition 
We define spontaneous recognition as 
“the accidental identification of a data subject (that is, without actively searching), whether that identification is 
accurate or not”. 
This broadly follows the definition of Duncan et al. (2011), but we add the condition that the identification need not 
be accurate, in contrast to the implicit assumption in most of the SDC literature. That literature does of course 
recognise that false identification may occur, but it focuses on accurate identification for pedagogical reasons. The 
impact of false inference is usually treated as a separate topic, if at all. 
This popular working assumption, that identification is only a problem if the true identity is uncovered, is clearly 
consistent with legal requirements to keep data confidential, but it ignores the institutional impact. Asserting that 
confidentiality can be breached can have a substantial effect on the reputation of the data provider, whether that 
assertion is true or not. For example, one NSI had to undertake a substantial public relations operation after it was 
(falsely) claimed that a multinational supermarket used confidential census data to send out mailshots. 
An additional complication is defining the “data subject” whose identity is being uncovered. Some data subjects, 
such as organisations, can have complex structures which makes identification a much more difficult concept. 
For example, assume that there is one university on the Isle of Wight, an island in the southern UK
1
.  Suppose a 
researcher using business data from the island comes across an entity whose industrial classification describes it 
as a “university”, and finds no other entities with that classification. There are three possibilities: 
 This is the whole university. 
 This is part of the university. 
 This is a branch office of a mainland university; the reporting units of the Isle of Wight university are not 
classified as “university” for some reason. 
Clearly with complex data subjects there is more uncertainty about the “accuracy” of the identification. Hence, we 
regard spontaneous recognition as occurring when the data user thinks “I have found a data subject that I can put 
a name to”, irrespective of whether that name relates to an accurately identified unit or not. 
Two other definitions are necessary: identity confirmation and assertion. 
“Identity confirmation” is where a user who spontaneously recognises a data subject takes active steps to confirm 
his or her suspicions about the data subject. For example, the researcher could cross-check with other information 
in the dataset, or external information. This differs from the usual intruder model in that the researcher has no 
specific interest in attacking the dataset; the researcher’s curiosity has been aroused, and the purpose of further 
investigation is to satisfy that curiosity. 
                                                        
1 This is for exemplary purposes. We are not aware, at present, of any university on the Isle of Wight. 
 “Identity assertion” is where a user who spontaneously recognises a data subject reports his or her suspicions to 
someone else, again without deliberate intent to reveal information but as a human response to an interesting 
finding. 
Since these two concepts both require action by the user after the initial suspicion has been aroused, we combine 
them as “identity confirmation and/or assertion”. 
4. A legal, statistical or management problem? 
4.1 Spontaneous recognition as a statistical problem 
There are three statistical risks arising from spontaneous literature, but only two are widely described in the 
literature: 
1. Population uniques on one or two characteristics or extreme values 
For example, in 2014 the first female bishop in the UK Anglican Church was elected. This was a high profile event, 
with wide newspaper coverage. Female clerics in the UK are comparatively rare, and a detailed job description or 
a salary range (indicating the highest paid) combined with gender could prompt a memory in the data user. 
Alternatively, a small geographical area might have one well-known high-value celebrity resident. Salary or wealth 
data may be enough to uniquely identify that individual. For business data, population uniques are the most 
significant problem. Detailed industrial classification and size of business (typically employment or turnover) are 
assumed to be enough to identify well-known large players, such as in telecoms or aerospace. 
2. Sample uniques where the sample is known 
Sample uniques which are not population uniques on the key characteristics are not normally of concern; by 
definition they represent at least two indistinguishable data subjects. However, we can consider cases where the 
data user might have additional information about the sample, making the sample uniques into population uniques. 
For example, a neighbour, on learning that a researcher is using a particular dataset, may tell the researcher that 
she was included in a specific wave.  
3. Sample uniques mistaken for population uniques 
An unsophisticated user may mistake a sample unique for a population unique, and draw an inappropriate 
inference. This is rarely discussed in the literature for the simple reason that it has no obvious statistical solution, 
arising as it does from an individual’s misperception. 
To avoid these risks, SDC good practice normally requires that population uniques are disguised or removed; and 
sample uniques are avoided or limited, particularly where the number of population uniques is small. For example, 
Schulte-Nordholt (2013) describe Dutch public use census files as having a minimum of 1000 observations on any 
three-way combination of characteristics, and a minimum of five observations when observed on all household 
characteristics. Statistics New Zealand’s old Confidentiality Protocol explicitly equated spontaneous recognition 
with population uniques (Statistics NZ, 2000, appendix B). This is why business data is commonly described as 
being impossible to anonymise: the variables of interest (industrial classification, size) are essential components in 
research, and so cannot be removed while maintaining value in the data. 
This practice is uncontroversial, and allows SDC advisors to concentrate on the seemingly more important 
problem of active, intruder, attacks on confidentiality. It is assumed that re-identification through deliberate action 
must have a success rate which is no lower than that of accidental discovery. Spontaneous recognition is “intruder 
 matching without a match model” (Mackey, 2013); therefore it can be treated as the less interesting special case. 
Mackey (2013), for example, regards spontaneous recognition as providing the starting point for the formal 
intruder-based review. 
Nevertheless, examining spontaneous recognition in its own right can throw light on some of the underlying or 
implicit assumptions in the intruder model. 
First, intruder models are designed to give risk measures based on assumptions about behaviour. However, the 
risk of spontaneous recognition cannot be estimated and cannot be proved not to exist, because the personal 
information that leads to it is unknowable. A dataset will contain population uniques unless it is K-anonymous on all 
variables (that is, any combination of variables, including continuous variables, must give at least K duplicate 
observations); for spontaneous recognition, K=2 as no active matching is considered. A fully K-anonymous dataset 
has limited research value, and so in practice removal of uniques is carried out using a subset of variables which is 
determined subjectively (Skinner, 2012). Therefore spontaneous recognition based on an unpredicted combination 
of variables must be possible. For example, wages are not normally considered identifying except for extreme 
values; but a researcher looking at a dataset on employees might notice a promotion in the wage data, and link 
that to personal knowledge of a specific employee.  
Second, protection measures designed to stop intruders may not be relevant for identity confirmation. By 
construction, spontaneous recognition arises from a combination of knowledge not foreseen in the protection 
algorithm; in terms of behaviour, spontaneous recognition is the exact opposite of active, intruder, re-identification. 
It follows that cross-checking of information in the dataset to confirm a suspicion does not need to use the scenario 
applied in order to create the protection algorithm. 
Third, it is not possible to test for spontaneous recognition when assessing the effectiveness of SDC protection in 
a dataset. By construction, spontaneous recognition arises from the accidental linkage of personal information with 
specific data. Testing by asking users to try re-identifying data subjects (as for example in Spicer et al., 2013) 
cannot formally replicate the conditions for accidental re-identification (although it would clearly provide useful 
evidence as to whether the data protection is “good enough”). 
Fourth, the likelihood of inaccurate spontaneous recognition is not covered in the SDC literature for the simple 
reason that there is no meaningful way to address the problem. What is the probability that a user looking at a 
dataset will make assertions based on an inaccurate identification? There is good empirical evidence that humans 
are over-confident in their ability to re-identify data subjects (Kahnemann, 2012), but this evidence is based on 
tests under known conditions where test subjects are required to express their confidence in their predictions. It is 
not clear how one would test whether this applies in non-test conditions where data users are under no pressure to 
express an opinion.  
Finally, spontaneous recognition is implicitly accepted in research files. For public use files (PUFs; those with no 
restrictions on use), stringent precautions are taken against direct attack, and hence spontaneous recognition.  For 
scientific use files (SUFs: access limited to verified researchers) and secure use files (SecUFs: access limited to 
controlled environments), the level of precaution is more complex as more controls are available. For example, 
Spicer et al. (2013) discuss how the access restrictions on SUFs enable a more relaxed approach to intruder 
attacks. However, this implies a simultaneous increase in the probability of spontaneous recognition. In other 
words, for anything other than PUFs, a non-negligible level of spontaneous recognition is implicitly being accepted. 
To see this, consider that each data access solution can be cast as a matter of choosing control in five dimensions: 
projects, people, settings, data and outputs; this is the widely used Five Safes model (Desai et al., 2015; 
www.fivesafes.org). Any specific solution will place more or less emphasis on different elements. For example, 
 there are no possible controls over who can do what with a PUF; therefore, the only thing that can be done is to 
control the confidentiality risk in the data. In contrast, a SecUF operating through a safe centre such as that run by 
Eurostat has a high degree of control over the users, environment, purpose of the work, and any outputs, and so 
minimal restrictions can be placed on data; see  Table 1. 
Table 1 Subjective expectation of access controls and risk 
File type Control possible 
Acceptable 
intruder risk 
Acceptable SR 
risk 
PUF Data only Negligible Negligible 
SUF Some degree of 
control over all 
elements 
More than PUF More than PUF 
SecUF High degree of 
control over all 
elements 
More than SUF More than SUF 
The more non-statistical controls that are applied to the data, the fewer controls need to be applied to the data 
itself. Acceptance of spontaneous recognition and intruders is implicit when anything other than a PUF is being 
designed. 
In summary, spontaneous recognition and its consequences are unpredictable, untestable and unprovable. This 
means that protection based around the notion of the predictable intruder might be ineffective.  
In practice, spontaneous recognition is ignored. 
For PUFs, the evidence of a half century of anonymisation suggests that focusing on intruders seems to provide 
adequate protection. Inaccurate assertions about individuals do not seem problematic. In files created for 
researchers (SUFs and SecUFs), a non-negligible risk of spontaneous recognition is implicitly accepted. 
4.2 Spontaneous recognition as a legal problem 
If spontaneous recognition does happen, it is not clear that any breach of confidentiality has occurred.  
In PUFs, spontaneous recognition would imply that the anonymisation procedure has failed. While the data 
providers would be expected to review the anonymisation procedures, it is unlikely that this would lead to legal 
consequences. Most data protection laws (for example, the regulation covering data management in the EU) 
require data providers to take all reasonable protection measures, not all measures. Some laws explicitly absolve 
the data provider of legal responsibility in the case of a mistake (Green and Ritchie, 2016). It would be difficult to 
argue that an intruder-protected PUF is inadequately protected against spontaneous recognition (assuming that 
the intruder protection is carried out to an accepted standard). 
For researcher files, a non-negligible risk of spontaneous recognition is implicitly if not explicitly approved, as 
noted above. Are there consequences if a researcher recognises a data subject? No; the researcher has been 
granted lawful access to the data in that state, and nothing has changed. 
What happens next does matter. The researcher has four options: 
 1. Identity confirmation: cross-checking the data with any other information; 
2. Identity assertion: mentioning the fact to another researcher or a non-user; 
3. Identity assertion: mentioning the fact to the data provider;  
4. Taking no further action. 
Action (1) may or may not be a breach of confidentiality, but it is almost certainly a breach of the access terms of 
the data, as the researcher is now trying to actively re-identify a data subject (in many jurisdictions, this would also 
be a breach of the law). 
Action (2) is also likely to be a breach of access terms: mentioning something discovered about a data subject 
could be taken as seeking confirmation of the identity of the data subject, seeking to provide another with 
identifying information, or both.  It is not clear whether an offence has been committed if the identification is 
inaccurate, but most data access agreements ban any information being shared about data subjects, whether that 
information is accurate or not. 
The consequences of action (3) depend on the attitudes of the data provider. Data providers following Active 
Researcher Management principles (Desai and Ritchie, 2010) should welcome information about easily 
recognisable subjects as an opportunity to review protection measures in the light of new information. However, 
the authors have observed data facilities where any speculation about the identity of data subjects, even to the 
data providers and irrespective of intent, is strictly forbidden and liable to penalties. 
Some data providers require users to report any suspected identification, and so action (4) may be a breach of 
access conditions. However, it is not clear how a data provider could prove that spontaneous recognition has 
happened, unless one of actions (1) to (3) was also taken. 
In summary, spontaneous recognition by itself does not seem a breach of confidentiality on behalf of the data user. 
For PUFs, the fault lies with the creator of the file. For research files, any breach of law or access agreements 
arises from additional actions taken by the researcher. In other words, the problem arises from the actions of the 
users, not the statistical protection in the data.  
4.3 Spontaneous recognition as a management problem 
A non-negligible possibility of spontaneous recognition is implicitly accepted in research data files, and poses no 
legal problems. Breaches of confidentiality or procedures occur when the data user takes some follow-up action, 
identity confirmation or assertion. This clearly identifies the risk associated with spontaneous recognition as a user 
management problem.  
This perspective offers several advantages over seeing it as a statistical or legal problem. 
First, it focuses on the unlawful activity: searching for identity, or speculating on identity with someone else. It does 
not criminalise users for an automatic response (recognition) to some information presented to them. It penalises 
behaviour, not thoughts. 
Second, it is likely to be easier to detect actions to confirm or assert an identity, whereas detecting whether 
someone has identified a data subject is impossible to know until they share that knowledge. 
Third, it requires no assumptions to be made about what personal knowledge a data user might have that could 
lead to spontaneous recognition. It is only the outcomes that matter, not the inputs. 
 Fourth, it reduces incentives to damage data as protection against something which is explicitly acceptable, at 
least in research files. 
Fifth, the protection measures are already in place to a large degree. Providers of research files usually give users 
training or written guidelines, or both, which state that attempts to re-identify data subjects, or discuss 
characteristics of the data with unauthorised users, is prohibited.  Data access agreements may have similar 
wording, although there is little evidence to suggest that users read these. 
Six, the management approach can be applied to PUFs as well as research files. Thus, recognition of an individual 
in a PUF is no longer a failure of statistical technique, but the manifestation of a known and accepted managerial 
risk. The change in emphasis, from blaming individuals to corporate learning, should discourage SDC advisors 
from worst-case risk avoidance strategies to protect themselves.  
Finally, as this is a management issue, and not a legal one, then the data provider can choose to promote positive 
behaviours. For example, reporting of suspected identification without penalty can be encouraged. 
Best practice user training and communication encourages the development of a community of interest between 
researchers and the data providers (Desai and Ritchie, 2010; Eurostat, 2016). Training on spontaneous 
recognition versus identity confirmation or assertion can be used to reinforce messages of trust in the training. The 
unavoidability of human failings can be contrasted with working with the support team to ensure that no-one gets 
into trouble, for example: 
“You may come across a data subject you think you recognise; we can’t stop your brain making links. But don’t 
ever try to confirm your suspicions, or talk about them; this counts as trying re-identify a data subject, which will 
get you into a lot of trouble. Come and talk to us if you find something you think shouldn’t be there.” 
Messages about inaccurate identification can also be pushed in training. The fictional example of the Isle of Wight 
university, given above, could be used to emphasise the scope for error in any assertions: 
“…and the chances are that your identification is wrong, which means you’ll still be in deep trouble but you’ll look 
like an idiot as well…” 
In summary, viewing spontaneous recognition as an irrelevance, and seeing identity confirmation or assertion as a 
problem of user management: 
 addresses only unlawful activity; 
 allows data providers more flexibility to deal with problems, even for PUFs; 
 encourages a community of interest amongst data providers and users; 
 is consistent with current best practice training principles (Eurostat, 2016). 
5. Cultures, attitudes and default perspectives 
Although it may have no statistical value, the concept of spontaneous recognition can have a practical impact 
because of the data provider’s cultural perspective and resulting attitudes. These reflect the way that the decision-
making process is approached in the organisation, and what the organisation sees as its main priorities. 
The institutional culture of the data providers can be simplified as one of the following (Hafner et al., 2015): 
 Default-open: release data unless the release is shown to be unsafe; 
  Default-closed: do not release data unless the release is shown to be safe. 
In theory these two positions are identical, but Ritchie (2014a) shows that the phrasing generates a very different 
response. It arises because of a difference in what is perceived as the initial “endowment” (Kahnemann, 2012). In 
the default-open model, research value is the default position, and it is being traded off for increased security; in 
the default-closed model, the opposite is the case. Humans value losses more highly than gains, and so the 
default perspective will affect the outcome.  
Most NSIs notionally claim to be default-open; in the author’s experience, almost everyone is default-closed. 
Ritchie (2014a, 2016) and Hafner et al. (2015a) note that the default-closed culture arises from three sources: 
 institutional incentives in the public sector tend to be focused on the costs of individuals making bad 
decisions, rather than the overall loss to society of good decisions foregone; in other words, the public sector 
is encouraged to think defensively (Ritchie, 2014a); 
 the statistical literature emphasises extreme scenarios, hypothetical examples, and worst-case risk 
avoidance, rather than evidence-based modelling, encouraging risk aversion in data providers who are not 
experts in assessing disclosure risk analyses (Hafner et al., 2015; Ritchie, 2016); 
 the public choice literature, which has dominated public sector management since the 1980s, encourages 
data providers to view users as self-interested and so inherently untrustworthy (Ritchie, 2014a). 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that NSIs develop risk-averse cultures. In this context, statistical 
analysis is essential for allowing an NSI to claim an objective rationale for its decisions, despite these decisions 
being highly subjective (Skinner, 2012). 
The Five Safes model discussed above is a decision-making framework rather than a strategic tool; nevertheless, 
it does illustrate how the statistical tail can wag the research dog.  For a default-open NSI, focused on research, 
“projects”, “people” and “settings” are the key dimensions; the other two imply at least a potential restriction on 
research, which is not a desirable outcome. SDC is something that happens when the other controls do not 
provide an appropriately secure solution for the users. In contrast, for a default-closed NSI, confidentiality is more 
important than use value, and so using the “objective” tools of SDC protection is more appealing. 
For a default-closed data provider, spontaneous recognition offers an unbeatable hand. As noted above, 
spontaneous recognition arises from an unexpected combination of luck and unpredictable knowledge. It is not 
possible to demonstrate that this cannot happen, nor is there any evidence that it cannot happen (such evidence 
would have been incorporated into predictable risk). Hence, a data provider unwilling to release data can declare 
spontaneous recognition as a risk without fear of losing the argument. 
This can be done even though, for all practical purposes, the intruder model and management strategies make 
spontaneous recognition irrelevant. For a default-closed data provider, little expected practical impact may not be 
enough; it is the potential for spontaneous recognition to occur that must be demonstrably negligible. 
For a default-open data provider, the reverse is true: spontaneous recognition can be a very useful check on the 
validity of one’s risk scenarios. Considering spontaneous recognition encourages one to treat and eliminate the 
foreseeable risks; when the only remaining untreated risk is spontaneous recognition (i.e. entirely unpredictable 
risk), then the data provider can be satisfied that the release is now no longer “shown to be unsafe” to any limit of 
reasonableness. 
 In short, for the default-open data provider spontaneous recognition offers a handy rule-of-thumb to determine 
whether there are any remaining untreated risks in a dataset; for a default-closed owner, it offers unlimited 
potential to place an unfeasible burden of proof on those wanting to release data.  
This issue raises important questions about the way data providers are persuaded to allow their data to be used. 
Data providers should be concerned about identity confirmation or assertion, but they may be unable to articulate it 
as the literature focuses on spontaneous recognition. Those advocating greater use therefore have a role to play 
in making data providers aware of the specific risk being raised. As Green and Ritchie (2016) note, there is very 
little hard evidence about genuine risks because academic research is generally a very low-risk activity; however, 
the operational (and cost) implications of alternative perspectives can be very large. 
6. Case study: the 2010 CIS scientific use file 
We conclude with a brief discussion of a specific case where an evidence-based managerial approach to 
spontaneous recognition led to substantially better outcomes for both data provider and researchers. The case 
study is discussed in more detail in Hafner et al. (2015b). 
The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) has been conducted every two years since the 1990s, and collects 
information from businesses on their innovation and research and development (R&D) activity. It is a stratified 
sample – a higher proportion of large firms are included – and most of the variables are qualitative. Each EU 
country carries out its own survey, using the same (translated) questionnaire. The results are transmitted to 
Eurostat as aggregate tables, but most countries also send their microdata to Eurostat. This allows researchers 
visiting the Eurostat Safe Centre (ESC) in Luxembourg to have access to a pan-European SecUF. Government 
users tend to produce tables from the data, whereas researchers use the microdata to produce regressions and 
other marginal analyses. 
Travelling to the ESC in Luxembourg incurs time and money costs for researchers. Distributing the data via an 
SUF would address some of the needs, and Eurostat creates SUFs for other datasets (such as the European 
Labour Force Survey). SUFs based on business data are rare because of the supposed ease of identifying large 
and unusual businesses, but Eurostat had commissioned SUFs on the CIS from 2004 onwards. However, the 
anonymisation technique employed removed a substantial amount of detail, and there was a general impression 
that the dataset was better suited to teaching than research. 
In 2013 Eurostat commissioned a review of the procedures used to create the CIS SUFs, with a view to improving 
the methods and applying them to the 2010 CIS. The method used for the pre-2010 surveys assumed that 
business units would be easily recognisable (spontaneous recognition and intruder activity were not distinguished), 
and so micro-aggregated all the continuous variables on all observations to reduce the value of information 
obtained in the event of a successful re-identification (this would also lower the identifiability of businesses 
somewhat). This was the preferred alternative to distorting the identifying characteristics of the businesses, such 
as size or industry, but it substantially reduced the analytical potential of the dataset.  
The team commissioned to review the method argued that: 
 the non-statistical controls on the data (project, setting and people), plus training on outputs, provided 
substantial protection for the data against intruders;  
 the complexity of business data provided substantial protection against accurate spontaneous recognition 
and against identity confirmation; 
 the micro-aggregation biased the marginal analyses which were the main reason for requesting the dataset; 
  employment, industry and country of ownership were identifying characteristics, but these could be put into 
broad categories designed to align with the typical categories used by researchers. 
The source datasets had been available for some years in the ESC and in the provider countries. There was no 
evidence to suggest that researchers were interested in re-identifying companies, even in the small countries 
where big firms were more noticeable. 
The research team argued that the only extant risks from the data were from researchers asserting that a 
particular entity had been found. The team accordingly advised that statistical disclosure control should be largely 
replaced by management controls: researchers were to be reminded that speculating on the nature of specific 
businesses was liable to (a) be wrong and (b) get them into trouble. 
Micro-aggregation of turnover data was recommended in a very small number of extreme cases where it was 
thought that human nature might encourage researchers to make assertions or try to confirm the researcher’s 
identity, but no other variables were micro-aggregated. The team also added a marker for whether a business was 
micro-aggregated or not. This suggestion caused some concern, but the team argued that researchers were 
always able to work out which firms had been micro-aggregated, which could lead to spontaneous recognition; 
putting in the marker was safer because it dissuaded them from trying to do so. 
Previous versions of the data had all continuous variables micro-aggregated for all records, and each variable was 
micro-aggregated independently of the others. The revised method micro-aggregated less than 1% of the records, 
and did this for just one continuous variable (turnover). Where turnover was perturbed, other continuous variables 
were adjusted up or down to reduce the impact of the micro-aggregation on marginal analyses. 
The result was a substantially higher quality research dataset, much closer to the SecUF. The impact on research 
quality was tested by running linear and non-linear regressions on both the SecUF and SUF. The results showed 
that the new method gave almost identical results on the two datasets, a notable improvement on the previous 
method. The method has subsequently been applied to later datasets. 
This improvement arose solely from a change in perspective – moving from a default-closed to a default-open 
model. Crucial to the outcome was recognising that intruder models had no role to play in the risk scenarios once 
the release environment was considered, and that the risk of spontaneous recognition was best dealt with by user 
management. 
7. Conclusion 
The public good is best served by making data available for research with as little damage as possible. Data 
providers, facing institutional pressures which encourage them to place the needs of the organisation over the 
wider public good, raise concerns about both the deliberate re-identification of individuals (the intruder model) and 
accidental re-identification through spontaneous recognition.  
The intruder model is the workhorse of statistical data protection; almost the entire literature and most practice is 
based on it. In contrast, spontaneous recognition has undergone negligible formal examination. It is used for 
pedagogical purposes, to demonstrate simple examples, before the intruder model takes over in formal modelling. 
One reason for this is that spontaneous recognition is not easily amenable to formal modelling. By its nature, it 
arises from unpredictable knowledge. If that knowledge were predictable, then intruder models would be able to 
incorporate it. This leads to the second reason for ignoring spontaneous recognition: it is subsumed into the 
intruder model as a special case. 
 Despite this lack of theoretical or practical value, data providers do raise concerns about spontaneous recognition. 
The authors observe this most often in relation to business data, where it seems “obvious” that any useful micro-
dataset is going to include many pieces of information that would prompt a researcher to speculate on the identity 
of the business. Concerns about spontaneous recognition have in the past led to restrictions on data access 
despite there being no empirical support for the theoretical risks. With the rise of “big data” and social media, 
commentators have suggested that individual data may now be “recognisable”. 
Hence the conclusion of this paper, that the concept of spontaneous recognition has no place in data protection, is 
important. This conclusion derives from two observations. 
The first observation is that the intruder model, despite its flaws, does effectively encompass the spontaneous 
recognition problem: it focuses on predictable risks and allows for active searching, meaning that any remaining 
risk arises from luck and a complete unpredictable set of events. This is likely to meet the test of “reasonableness” 
embodied in most data protection laws. Since the intruder model can be applied to different environments (PUFs, 
SUFs, SecUFs), it can incorporate spontaneous recognition in those different environments. 
The second observation is that any re-identification from spontaneous recognition leads to a managerial problem. 
Breach of confidentiality arises from the follow-on actions of the user, the identity confirmation or assertion, not the 
spontaneous recognition itself. Hence any management plan must focus on the training of users and the 
relationship between users and data providers, not on predicting the unpredictable. 
Nevertheless, an examination of spontaneous recognition can usefully highlight implicit assumptions being made 
in data release decisions; and it demonstrates the importance of the data provider’s attitude. With the default-
closed attitude spontaneous recognition is an unplayable hand whose only value is to block access. With a default-
open attitude, spontaneous recognition becomes a useful sounding board to explore the limits of our knowledge 
and develop non-statistical risk models to cover for the “unknown unknowns”. 
In summary, the statistical problem of spontaneous recognition is an unhelpful chimaera encouraging the 
underutilisation of valuable data. The problem that should be addressed is one of identity confirmation, which is a 
management issue. A change in both language and attitudes, a focus on the exact nature of the problem being 
raised, and the use of evidence can generate substantial dividends for both data providers and users. 
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